Post by alxeu on Jul 21, 2022 19:21:33 GMT -5
The Economy of Seleucidenia
Overview
The economy of the Shahdom of Seleucidenia operates under a highly centralized state apparatus that begrudgingly shares power with wealthy industrialists and noble landowners in order to increase the flexibility of the otherwise inflexible state organ. Where the government directs investment, individual industrialists plan the specific factories and what is produced in what amounts, and where the government directs crops to be grown, the landowners decide which plots are to be used for which crops. The government does not collect on the value of the products until the yearly unutilized income tax is collected, with this resulting in differing incomes for the state depending on how profitable an industry is. Armaments and other necessary but unprofitable industries (armaments being unprofitable due to the government basically being able to seize back the money it just spent on weapons) are generally run by the government's bureaucracy, which varies in efficiency and independence region by region, industry by industry.
The main defining feature of Seleucidenia's economy, as well as Seleucidenia, in general, is that way it handles laborer-employer relations. Codified in the End of Serfdom Decree of 1857, Seleucideni employment is handled by the Labor Contract System. The LCS is the defining system of employment in Seleucidenia, and practically all but the smallest of employers utilize it. LCS contracts follow a strict formation: Section I defines the worker's obligations to the employer, Section II defines the employer's obligations to the worker, Section III defines length of the contract, Section IV defines means by which the contact can be ended early by either party, and Section V includes special cases based on employer desires. These contracts implement what is effectively a modernized form of serfdom or indentured servitude, where workers agree to devote themselves to an employer for a specific wage for a duration of time, during which the employer is expected to provide a place of residence, and if the pay is not graded to include the cost of living in the area (as rated by the local governance to include costs of cheap clothing, food, and heating), the employer must provide those services, as well. As the extra money from a contract cannot be saved year-to-year, this income is usually used to purchase non-essential goods such as nicer clothing, non-staple food ingredients like sugar, or paying for education or the well-being of unemployed family members, like children or elderly parents.
The system generally works where there is competent, energetic governance. The sweeping executive powers of local governors when there is no imperial interference means that these highly basic terms are usually supplemented by additional concessions or minimum requirements of the employer, based on perceived necessary adjustments by the local governments. Since most bureaucrats are of a recently elevated middle class conscious of the dreary lives of their parents, there is generally motivation amongst the bureaucracy to trim the worst excesses of the Labor Contract System, and services like adjusting contract pay rates to account for children, preventing employers from changing too extremely the promised job description of an employee, and preventing employee contracts from being sold between industries means that the most problematic aspects of the system are softened away. In Kee Province, run by the Crown Prince, the dismissive lack of oversight from the Shah means that significant reforms to the contact system have taken place, reducing the income made by industrialists in the region... but also ensuring expanded access to education, shorter working days, and a general immigration of workers outside of contracts to the region, forcing some industrialists to resign themselves to expanding in the region to just follow their workforce.
Therefore, the system most lacks one thing: flexibility. Should conditions change within Seleucidenia too rapidly, such as famine or rapid inflation in prices, the vast majority of Labor Contracts would become insufficient to cover the necessary expenses of the people obligated by them, and there has yet been any action by local bureaucrats to adjust the contract system to account for such events. The Shah has previously overruled adjustments to the Labor Contract System deemed too permissive to the employees, citing the needs of capital and industry in the still developing nation. Furthermore, it is widely expected that in times of war, the Shah will only double-down against such liberties, and make wide-spread proclamations that will severely restrict employee rights in contracts in order to ensure stability in the workforce during war conditions.
Overview
The economy of the Shahdom of Seleucidenia operates under a highly centralized state apparatus that begrudgingly shares power with wealthy industrialists and noble landowners in order to increase the flexibility of the otherwise inflexible state organ. Where the government directs investment, individual industrialists plan the specific factories and what is produced in what amounts, and where the government directs crops to be grown, the landowners decide which plots are to be used for which crops. The government does not collect on the value of the products until the yearly unutilized income tax is collected, with this resulting in differing incomes for the state depending on how profitable an industry is. Armaments and other necessary but unprofitable industries (armaments being unprofitable due to the government basically being able to seize back the money it just spent on weapons) are generally run by the government's bureaucracy, which varies in efficiency and independence region by region, industry by industry.
The main defining feature of Seleucidenia's economy, as well as Seleucidenia, in general, is that way it handles laborer-employer relations. Codified in the End of Serfdom Decree of 1857, Seleucideni employment is handled by the Labor Contract System. The LCS is the defining system of employment in Seleucidenia, and practically all but the smallest of employers utilize it. LCS contracts follow a strict formation: Section I defines the worker's obligations to the employer, Section II defines the employer's obligations to the worker, Section III defines length of the contract, Section IV defines means by which the contact can be ended early by either party, and Section V includes special cases based on employer desires. These contracts implement what is effectively a modernized form of serfdom or indentured servitude, where workers agree to devote themselves to an employer for a specific wage for a duration of time, during which the employer is expected to provide a place of residence, and if the pay is not graded to include the cost of living in the area (as rated by the local governance to include costs of cheap clothing, food, and heating), the employer must provide those services, as well. As the extra money from a contract cannot be saved year-to-year, this income is usually used to purchase non-essential goods such as nicer clothing, non-staple food ingredients like sugar, or paying for education or the well-being of unemployed family members, like children or elderly parents.
The system generally works where there is competent, energetic governance. The sweeping executive powers of local governors when there is no imperial interference means that these highly basic terms are usually supplemented by additional concessions or minimum requirements of the employer, based on perceived necessary adjustments by the local governments. Since most bureaucrats are of a recently elevated middle class conscious of the dreary lives of their parents, there is generally motivation amongst the bureaucracy to trim the worst excesses of the Labor Contract System, and services like adjusting contract pay rates to account for children, preventing employers from changing too extremely the promised job description of an employee, and preventing employee contracts from being sold between industries means that the most problematic aspects of the system are softened away. In Kee Province, run by the Crown Prince, the dismissive lack of oversight from the Shah means that significant reforms to the contact system have taken place, reducing the income made by industrialists in the region... but also ensuring expanded access to education, shorter working days, and a general immigration of workers outside of contracts to the region, forcing some industrialists to resign themselves to expanding in the region to just follow their workforce.
Therefore, the system most lacks one thing: flexibility. Should conditions change within Seleucidenia too rapidly, such as famine or rapid inflation in prices, the vast majority of Labor Contracts would become insufficient to cover the necessary expenses of the people obligated by them, and there has yet been any action by local bureaucrats to adjust the contract system to account for such events. The Shah has previously overruled adjustments to the Labor Contract System deemed too permissive to the employees, citing the needs of capital and industry in the still developing nation. Furthermore, it is widely expected that in times of war, the Shah will only double-down against such liberties, and make wide-spread proclamations that will severely restrict employee rights in contracts in order to ensure stability in the workforce during war conditions.